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Firm is a Nexus of a Set of Contracting Relationships (Coase, 1937; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). There are two levels of Principal-Agent 
Relationship in the nexus of firm: Shareholders-The Board, and the Board-Top 
manager. Through these contracting relationships, only some important decision 
control rights are kept in shareholders while the board of directors holds the most 
decision control rights, including firing top managers and other monitoring 
actions. 
The incompleteness of contract and self-interest of agents cause agency 
problems. Based on the nature of contract, agency problems are divided into two 
categories: debt agency problems and equity agency problems. Firing agent is a 
cheap and effective way to resolve serious agency problems (Fama, 1980; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). Firing incompetent agents is an important function of the 
board of directors and has been taken as a key criterion to judge the efficiency of 
the board. When agency problems are serious enough beyond what the principals 
can bear and can not been resolved by other governance mechanisms such as 
monitoring, incentives, then they will choose to fire these agents. On the contrary, 
excluding some special cases, the agents fired shall be those who have serious 
agency problems. As a result, it are those and only are those who have serious 
agency problems get fired. So, we can analyze the efficiency of corporate 
governance and investor protection through investigating the correlation between 
agency problems and agent change. 
This study analyzes the agency problems between shareholders, debtors and 
agent from agent change angle. Base on the result, we take a deeper research in 
the effect of different ownership structure and outside market monitors on agency 
problems. The study finds: (1) although there are serious agency problems 
between agent and debtors in China’s listed companies, no agency cost of debt 
was found, which means Chinese commercial banks and others debt investors are 














(2) Perk Consumption problem and overinvestment problem are two very 
important factors that cause agents to be dismissed, and this also proves that Perk 
Consumption and overinvestment problems exist commonly in the China’s listed 
companies. (3) According the companies with control right, agent’s Perk 
Consumption and overinvestment acts get controlled effectively. (4) Balance 
Mechanism of Blockholders can control the agent’s laziness and thereby reduced 
the low efficiency problem of state owned listed companies. (5) This paper does 
not find the monitoring and governance function of outside market participants 
(including foreign stockholders and debtors). 
Now it is the crucial period of China’s capital market reform. The shareholder 
structure reform have almost completed, which will be a historic step for China 
to a mature capital market. The next step, it will focus on how to perfect the 
corporate governance structure of listed companies, weaken agency problems 
and to protect investors more efficiently. This study positively analyzes the effect 
of ownership structure on agent change from agency cost angle. Based on this, 
we then take a further research on the governing function of ownership structure 
on agency problems and investor protection. There is a wealth of literature 
investigating the change of CEOs, but most of them analyzing the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanism and CEOs from the angle of 
performance of firms. However, we did not find the literature analyzing the agent 
change and ownership structure (shareholders structure and outside financing) 
directly from the angle of agency costs. So, we hope this research can give some 
contribution to China’s capital market development and investor protection. 
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出资者即股东，拥用企业的所有权，承担着企业的剩余风险 (Residual Risks 
Bearing)，并保留着企业的剩余索取权(Residual Claims)和主要决策控制权(Decision 
Control) ， 而 由 股 东 的 代 理 人 即 管 理 层 行 使 决 策 管 理 权 ① (Decision 
Management)(Fama and Jensen, 1983a)。 
企业是一系列契约的联结体，契约是企业的本质(Coase, 1937；Alchian and 






                                                        





































(Jensen and Meckling, 1976)。 
本文所述代理人通常指的公司的董事会及高层管理者，尤其特指这两层代理人
的核心代表董事长和 CEO，而“代理权变更”或“代理人变更”指的是公司的董






























从现有的文献来看，债务代理问题主要有两种形式，一种是 Jensen and 
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